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1. We should start with a brief explanation of the constitutional background against which 
the United Kingdom gives effect to what have become its obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights („the Convention‟).  The most basic principle in UK 
constitutional law is that Parliament is sovereign.  An Act of Parliament will trump any other 
form of legislative or legal act including, in the ordinary case, an international obligation 
entered into by the Government on behalf of Her Majesty.  A further consequence of the 
sovereignty of Parliament is that one Parliament cannot bind itself, let alone its successors, 
not to alter the laws it has made.  So where a later Act is inconsistent with a former one, the 
later Act is held to have “impliedly repealed” the earlier one. 
2. In recent years this doctrine of „implied repeal‟ has been questioned, in relation to 
certain statutes.  It has certainly not been applied in relation to statutes which have been 
found to be inconsistent with the UK‟s treaty obligations under the EU Treaties.  Thus, when 
certain provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 were found by the European Court of 
Justice („the ECJ‟) to be incompatible with the UK‟s Community obligations, the House of 
Lords had no difficulty in holding that European law must prevail, not that the 1988 Act had 
impliedly repealed the European Communities Act 1972
1
.  
3. In relation to Human Rights, the United Kingdom was one of the original drafters of the 
Convention, which was seen as an attempt, at international level, to prevent a situation in 
which a Government could remove what were seen as fundamental rights from its citizens. 
Essentially, the rights set out in the Convention were those which were thought already to be 
secured to the citizen in the United Kingdom, albeit in different ways, in both of the two law 
areas operating in that country.  Accordingly, the United Kingdom (like the other original 
States parties) did not, at the time of ratification of the Convention, consider that any of the 
prohibitions contained in it would be of any practical significance for the UK itself.   
4. When the right of individual application to the ECtHR was accorded to British citizens 
in 1966, that early view was found to be too optimistic.  Between the according of that right, 
and the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 („the HRA‟), proposed legislation 
                                                 
1
 Regina v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1991] A.C. 603: „If the supremacy within 
the European Community of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the E.E.C. 
Treaty (Cmnd. 5179-II) it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice long before 
the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it 
enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been 
clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law 
found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law‟.(per Lord Bridge of Harwich at paragraph 4). 
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was routinely examined so as to ensure its compatibility with the obligations in the 
Convention, and doubtful cases were scrutinised at an appropriate level within Government.   
5. When, in 1997-98, the then Government agreed to enable Convention rights to be 
litigated directly in UK courts, they addressed the question of incompatible statutory 
provision.  The HRA expressly provides that (all) primary legislation, whether passed before 
or after that Act, is to be read in a way which is compatible with Convention rights.  So an 
Act of Parliament which appeared to be incompatible with the HRA (and hence the 
Convention) would not be taken impliedly to have repealed the HRA.  Instead, by virtue of 
section 3 HRA, it would be interpreted, if at all possible, so as to be consistent with the 
Convention.  The sovereignty of Parliament is preserved by a provision to the effect that, if 
an Act cannot be read consistently with the Convention, then the court may do no more than 
declare that it is incompatible.  The inconsistent Act remains in force, and the Government 
and Parliament must decide, on a political level, whether to rectify the situation.   (For 
example, the House of Commons has recently indicated, very clearly, that it was not minded 
to extend voting rights to convicted prisoners.) 
6. This process of pre-legislative scrutiny for compliance with Convention obligations was 
formalised when the HRA was passed.  Section 19 of that Act requires the Minister 
promoting Government legislation to state that, in his view, the provisions of the legislation 
are, or are not, compatible with Convention rights.  Apart from legislation, that Act 
essentially made compliance with the Convention into a duty imposed on all public 
authorities.  Section 6(1) of the Act provides: 
„6(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right.‟ 
7. In the course of these answers we will see some examples of how the UK courts have 
interpreted that provision. 
8. In the light of what has happened in relation to European and Convention rights, UK 
courts are beginning to develop a theory that while all Acts of Parliament are notionally equal 
in force and effect, some may be more equal than others, in the sense that the doctrine of 
„implied repeal‟ does not apply in relation to them.  Thus, so this theory runs, it would be 
competent for the UK Parliament to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, or the 1998 
HRA, but that would require to be done formally and deliberately.  The courts will not 
assume that, because a later Act appears inconsistent with the terms of either the 1972 or 
1998 Acts, Parliament must have decided impliedly to repeal the Act concerned.  Into this 
category of special, constitutional Acts have gone the (English) Magna Carta of 1216, the 
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(English) Bill of Rights 1688, the (Scottish) Claim of Right Act 1689, the (UK)  European 
Communities 1972 Act, the HRA, and the constitutional settlements with Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland
2
.   
9. We should enter a caveat here.  Even where an Act is regarded as a constitutional Act, it 
does not follow that every provision in it sets out some general principle which will hold 
good for future generations.  For example, the Claim of Right Act 1689 sets out, in Scotland, 
the various ways in which James VII (of Scotland) and II (of England) had acted 
unconstitutionally, and specifically provided that such abuses must stop.  Thus, there is a 
prohibition on the Crown from purporting to annul laws made by Parliament.  That remains a 
valid concern, that the Executive should not be able to ignore or supersede legislation passed 
by Parliament, and that provision still has force in modern times.  But the Act also prohibits 
the establishment of Catholic schools, a prohibition entirely understandable in the context of 
Scotland (and England) in 1688-89, but no longer valid.  So it is not sufficient, to declare a 
right to be fundamental, to say that it is to be found in a „constitutional‟ Act.  Nor is it 
sufficient to say that it has been in force for a considerable time.  It must be a right which 
succeeding generations agree to be so. 
10. The position, at least in the United Kingdom, is that fundamental rights are not to be 
found in any single Act of Parliament, constitutional or otherwise.  They are to be found in an 
amalgam of substantive common law rights, statutory provisions and procedural rules which, 
taken together, secure the appropriate balance between, on the one hand, the public interest in 
the prosecution of offences and, on the other, the fundamental rights of the citizen. 
11. A further complication, in the UK, was the passing of the various devolution statutes, 
also in 1998, which set up legislative bodies in Scotland, Wales and (now) in Northern 
Ireland.  In this case the Westminster Parliament did not simply rely on the fact that section 6 
of the HRA would apply to the new administrations.  Taking the legislation relating to 
Scotland as an example, while the Scottish Executive – the Scottish Ministers – were, like 
other public authorities, subject to section 6(1) of the HRA, specific provision was inserted 
into the Scotland Act 1998 making it outside competence for the Scottish Ministers to act 
incompatibly with the UK‟s obligations under the Convention, and under EU law.  Thus, 
section 57(2) of that Act provides: 
                                                 
2
 Cf Thoburn v Sunderland City Council  [2002] EWHC 195 Admin per Lord Justice Laws at paragraph 62.  
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„57(2) A member of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate 
legislation, or to do any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with 
any of the Convention rights or with Community law.‟ 
12. This formulation raises several issues domestic to the different jurisdictions in the 
United Kingdom, but we shall mention only three, and look (briefly) at only one.  The first is 
that both the HRA and the Scotland Act enable UK courts to examine the compatibility, or 
the potential compatibility, of proposed acts of public authorities, whereas the ECtHR 
examines what has happened ex post facto.  This means that UK courts now have the power 
to prevent such action, rather than simply granting a remedy once an incompatible action has 
taken place.  This has, not unnaturally, produced a large number of attempts to prevent action 
on the part of public authorities. 
13. The second issue, which is primarily relevant for the devolved Scottish government, is 
what would be the position if an obligation under the Convention proved to be irreconcilable 
with an obligation under EU law.  This latter point has become more important following the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has the same legal effect as the Treaties.  In that connection we shall look in due 
course at the links between the two documents. 
14. The third issue, which arises only in domestic terms, is whether the phrase „has no 
power---to do any ---act‟ carries the same meaning as „it is unlawful for a public authority to 
act‟.  In terms of the Convention, the ECtHR is almost invariably asked to decide upon the 
compatibility of some action which has occurred some time previously, and after a litigation 
has progressed through all the stages of the domestic legal processes.  Its decision that the 
action was incompatible with the Convention is accompanied by a remedy, which may 
amount to no more than a declaration.  Where action is required by the state concerned to 
rectify the matter, that too may take some time.   
15. The situation is very different, and of much greater practical immediacy, where the 
domestic court can take a decision as to the compatibility of a proposed action with the 
Convention.  The question which arises is whether a court considering the matter prior to the 
action taking place can take the same approach, in particular in relation to remedies, as can 
the ECtHR.  Much of course will turn on the way in which the terms of the Convention have 
been incorporated into the law of the state concerned.  We have already mentioned the UK 
solution, which takes the form of declarations of incompatibility.  This question of possible 
remedies arises in relation to what may be a „gap‟ in the protection afforded by the 
Convention in terms of Question 1, to which we now turn.  
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Q 1 Are there any remaining (potential or actual) gaps in the substantive scope and level of 
protection of fundamental rights?  And can (potential) gaps in one fundamental rights source 
be filled by reference to other fundamental rights sources? 
 
16. With regard to the first part of the question, it is probably the case that the drafters of 
the original Convention would have conceded that there were gaps in the substantive scope 
and level of protection of fundamental rights (cf. the minority judgment in Feldbrugge v The 
Netherlands, infra.)  It is certainly the case that a number of further rights, or refinements of 
existing rights, have been developed either by Protocols attached to the original Convention 
or by the ECtHR.  We will suggest one example of what may be a gap, in relation to the 
Convention.  With regard to the second part, there are a number of instances where, even in 
relation to what might appear to be the same fundamental right, there are overlaps and in at 
least one case a clear difference between the Convention and the Charter, although how far 
these are deliberate extensions on the part of the later document is open to question.  
Right to trial within a reasonable time 
17. We would suggest that a gap in protection may have developed in relation to the right to 
be tried within a reasonable time, conferred by Article 6(1) of the Convention.  Essentially, 
the question is whether, if the prosecuting authorities in a State have failed to bring about a 
trial within a reasonable time, they should be allowed to do so thereafter.  The matter is 
illustrated by two cases before the highest courts in the UK, which also demonstrate the 
difficulties inherent in seeking to channel appeals from what are essentially different 
jurisdictions to a single appellate body. 
18. In 2002 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was asked to consider the appeal 
of a Mr Rourke, who had been charged in 1995 with two offences of indecent conduct 
towards young girls
3
.  Nothing further had been done, but in 2001 he was again charged, on 
indictment, with those offences, as well as with others.  He maintained that the time which 
had elapsed between the original charge in 1995, and the new charge in 2001, meant that by 
the time the proceedings were concluded the requirement, under Article 6(1) of the 
Convention, that he be tried within a reasonable time would have been breached.  
19. In consequence of the judicial arrangements then in place in the UK, human rights 
issues arising in England and Wales were referred to the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords, and human rights issues arising under the Scotland Act were referred to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.  Both of these august bodies were drawn from the same 
                                                 
3
 HM Advocate v R 2003 S.C. (P.C.) 1; [2004] 1 A.C. 462. 
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panel of distinguished judges, but in Scottish cases before the Privy Council it was customary 
to secure that three out of the (normally) five judges were from that jurisdiction. 
20. Mr Rourke‟s claim, in particular, was that, since there had been „an unreasonable 
delay‟, in terms of Article 6(1) of the Convention4, the Lord Advocate (the Scottish public 
prosecutor) „had no power‟ to continue proceedings against him5.   
21. The Lord Advocate essentially conceded that the delay had been unreasonable, in terms 
of Article 6, but said that since a fair trial was still possible he should be allowed to proceed.  
The court held first, by a (Scottish) majority, that it would be incompatible with the accused‟s 
rights under Article 6(1) for a trial to take place after the elapse of a „reasonable time‟.  
Second, they considered the question of remedy, and whether the different formulations of 
section 6(1) of the HRA and section 57(2) of the Scotland Act produced different results. By 
the same majority, they held that the results were indeed different: 
„If only the HRA applied, then the result of any finding of incompatibility would be 
that the Lord Advocate's "act" would be unlawful. There would be an act of the Lord 
Advocate but an unlawful act. But the Lord Advocate is not simply a public authority 
to whom section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act applies; he is also a member of the 
Scottish Executive to whom, in addition, section 57(2) of the Scotland Act applies. 
And subsection (2) goes further than section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act. By virtue 
of subsection (2) the Lord Advocate actually has no power to do an act so far as it is 
incompatible with any of the appellant's Convention rights. To that extent any such 
"act" of the Lord Advocate is invalid: it is not truly an "act" at all but merely a 
"purported" act.‟ (per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry at paragraph 125.) 
22. Essentially the same question came before the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords in December 2003
6
, where a panel of nine judges (including four of those who had sat 
on the Judicial Committee in the previous case) found, by an (English) majority that it was 
not incompatible with an accused‟s rights under Article 6(1) to hold a trial after the elapse of 
a reasonable time, provided always that it remained possible to hold a fair trial.  (The court 
also found, by the same majority, that there was no difference between the concepts of acting 
                                                 
4
 „6(1) In the determination -----of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time       ‟ (emphasis added). 
5
 „[H]e asserts that, if by going on with the prosecution the Lord Advocate infringes his right to a hearing within 
a reasonable time, then he must stop – not because the Convention says so but because section 57(2) of the 
Scotland Act says he has no power to go on‟ (per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, at paragraph 138. 
6
 Attorney General‟s Reference No 2 of 2001 [2003] UKHL 68. 
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unlawfully, in the HRA, and having no power to act, in the Scotland Act.
7
   That particular 
aspect of the House of Lords‟ decision would appear to give little weight to section 8 of the 
HRA, subsection (1) of which provides that: 
„8(1) In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court 
finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such 
order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate.‟  
23. The effect of these judgments was to produce different views as to the compatibility or 
otherwise of a trial held after a reasonable time as between Scotland, on the one hand, and 
England and Wales, on the other.  On one level, this does no more than reflect the different 
arrangements within the respective jurisdictions for dealing with criminal offences.  In 
Scotland there is and has always (or at least since 1701
8
) been a requirement to conduct 
criminal prosecutions expeditiously, and within statutory time limits.  If these are not 
complied with then the proceedings must be abandoned, and the accused cannot be charged 
again with that offence.  The practices and procedures of the public prosecutor in Scotland 
work within these statutory requirements. 
24. In England and Wales (and in a number of other European jurisdictions) the prosecutor 
is given more latitude.  Thus, in HM Advocate v R (cit. sup.), Lord Steyn observed: 
„For my part the interpretation advocated by the appellant would result in severe 
disruption of the effective and just functioning of the criminal justice system.-------If 
such a view were to be adopted in England-------the result would be a huge increase in 
stay applications in criminal courts at every level, with detrimental effect on the 
administration of justice.‟9 
25. We suspect that similar concerns would be voiced in a number of Continental European 
jurisdictions.  In that context we note that the European Council‟s Roadmap of November 
2009
10
 promised (and has begun to deliver) action on a range of issues for strengthening the 
rights of an accused person.  But in relation to pre-trial detention it promises no more than the 
examination of the issues in a Green Paper. 
                                                 
7
 „I cannot accept that it can ever be proper for a court, whose purpose is to uphold, vindicate and apply the law, 
to act in a manner which a statute----declares to be unlawful. ----I cannot accept that “compatible” bears a 
different meaning in section 6 of the Human Rights Act and section 57(2) of the Scotland Act, even though the 
statutory consequence is unlawfulness in the one instance and lack of power in the other.  In each case the act is 
one that may not lawfully be done.‟ (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill at paragraph 30.). 
8
 Criminal Procedure Act 1701, section 6 (Acts of the old Parliament of Scotland). 
9
 At paragraph 17. 
10
 (2009/C 295/01). 
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26. More generally, it would be difficult to apply any such requirement in relation to civil 
cases.  But that does not invalidate the principle in relation to criminal proceedings, where the 
pressure on the accused person is greatest.  If, in such cases, a failure to hold a trial within a 
reasonable time carries no sanction, beyond some monetary compensation, or a reduction in 
sentence, then the requirement may not be thought to be being observed with any real rigour. 
27. Nevertheless, that seems to be the position in the ECtHR, by reference to which the 
Judicial Committee was able to reverse its previous decision.  In the case of Kudla v 
Poland
11
, the Court held that the applicant‟s rights, to a trial within a reasonable time, under 
Article 6(1) had been breached.  In going on to consider the question of whether or not the 
applicant had open to him a remedy under Polish law, the Court observed: 
„It remains for the Court to determine whether the means available to the applicant in 
Polish law for raising a complaint about the length of the proceedings in his case 
would have been “effective” in the sense either of preventing the alleged violation or 
its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation that had already 
occurred.‟12 
28. Similar formulations were used by the Court in two civil cases13 and in another criminal 
case
14
.  It would therefore appear that the right to a trial within a reasonable time is not, like 
the other two factors mentioned in Article 6(1), something failure to implement which will 
nullify the proceedings. No doubt this is a pragmatic outcome, but it is hardly principled. 
Right to good administration 
29. This is a concept which is expressly provided for in Article 41 CFR.  The position under 
the Convention is more elaborate.  In relation to civil matters, Article 6 ECHR, as originally 
drafted, made no provision in relation to administrative justice.  This appears to have been 
because the concept of „civil rights and obligations‟ in that Article did not extend, in the 
Continental systems, to administrative tribunals, which were regarded as a matter of public 
law.  This is clear from the dissenting opinion – by seven judges – in Feldbrugge v The 
Netherlands 
15
.  But the ECtHR was able to extend its remit to persons affected by 
administrative decisions by reference to the fact that such decisions would have a knock-on 
                                                 
11
 ECtHR 26 October 2000, Case No. 30210/96, Kudla v Poland. 
12
 At paragraph 158. 
13
 ECtHR 10 September 2002, Case no. 57220/00, Mifsud v France; ECtHR 25 May 1999, Case no. 23308/94, 
Cocchiarella v Italy. 
14
 ECtHR 4 July 2006, Case no. 16631/04, Zarb v Malta: „Remedies available to a litigant at domestic level for 
raising a complaint about the length of proceedings are “effective” within the meaning of Article 13 of the 
Convention if they prevent the alleged violation or its continuation-------‟ (at Paragraph 48). 
15
 ECtHR (1986) 8 EHRR 425 at 444.   Cf the discussion by Lord Hoffman in Begum v London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets [2003] UKHL 5, at paragraphs 28 to 35. 
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effect on private law rights and obligations properly so called
16
.  In considering cases in 
relation to administrative tribunals, the Court was careful to avoid requiring every such 
tribunal to be itself “independent and impartial”. In particular, it was content to leave the 
administrative, or policy, elements of a decision to the appropriate authorities in the state 
concerned, securing only that those matters bearing upon the procedural correctness of the 
decision making process were reviewable by a tribunal which was itself compatible with 
Article 6.
17
  And in due course it was established that that latter tribunal itself need not be 
capable of taking its own view of the merits of the decision reviewed; it was sufficient if it 
were able to satisfy itself that the decision-making body had acted correctly.
18
 
30. It is interesting, if not remarkable, that the HRA has been interpreted as producing the 
same effect, in spite of what might be regarded as the clear words of the operative provision.  
Section 6(1) of the Act provides: 
„6(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention  right.‟ 
31. This very wide provision would appear to apply to all public authorities, including those 
exercising essentially administrative functions.  But in cases argued since the Act came into 
force (on 1
st
 October 2000) courts almost immediately began to deal with the matter as if it 
were Article 6 of the Convention which had become part of the law of the United Kingdom, 
and not section 6(1) of the 1998 Act.  The jurisprudence has settled itself into a position 
analogous to that reached, after the cases mentioned above, by the ECtHR.  Thus, in Begum v 
London Borough of Tower Hamlets
19
, Lord Hoffman observed, at paragraphs 52-54: 
„In this case the subject matter of the decision was the suitability of accommodation 
for occupation by Runa Begum; the kind of decision which the ECtHR has on several 
occasions called a “classic exercise of an administrative discretion”.  The manner in 
                                                 
16
 Cf ECtHR 16 July 1971, Case no. 2614/65, Ringeisen v Austria: „Although it was applying rules of 
administrative law, the Regional Commission‟s decision was to be decisive for the relations in civil law---
between Ringeisen and the Roth couple.  This is enough to make it necessary for the Court to decide whether or 
not the proceedings in this case complied with the requirements of Article6---.‟ 
17
 Thus, in Albert and Le Compte v Belgium 1983 5 EHRR 533, at paragraph 29, the Court observed: „---In 
many member States of the Council of Europe, the duty of adjudicating on disciplinary offences is conferred on 
jurisdictional organs of professional associations.  Even in instances where Article 6---is applicable, conferring 
powers in this manner does not in itself infringe the Convention.----------Nonetheless, in such circumstances the 
Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems; either the jurisdictional organs themselves 
comply with the requirements of Article 6---, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a 
judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6.‟ 
18
 ECtHR (1993) 17 EHRR 116, Zumtobel v Austria, where the Court observed, at paragraph 32: „Regard being 
had to the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the administrative authorities on grounds of 
expediency and to the nature of the complaints made by the Zumtobel partnership, the review by the 
Administrative Court accordingly, in this instance, fulfilled the requirements of Article 6---.‟ 
19
 Cit. sup. 
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which the decision was arrived at was by the review process, at a senior level in the 
authority‟s administration and subject to rules designed to promote fair decision-
making.----In my opinion the ECtHR has accepted, on the basis of general state 
practice and for the reasons of good administration which I have discussed, that in 
such cases a limited right of review on questions of fact is sufficient.----In the normal 
case of an administrative decision---fairness and rationality should be enough.‟ 
32. This is no doubt an entirely reasonable approach for the courts to take, but it focuses on 
what is required by Article 6 of the Convention, and not on what appears to be required by 
the clear words of section 6 of the 1998 Act. 
Ne bis in idem 
33. One of the principal gaps left in the Convention as originally drafted was in relation to 
the principle of ne bis in idem.  This is perhaps surprising.  Unlike the application of Article 6 
to matters of public administration which, as we have tried to demonstrate, was because of 
the difficulties which such an application might – and in fact did – cause, the principle of ne 
bis in idem was well established, certainly in the law areas of the United Kingdom, and also 
in European systems.  The ECJ found no difficulty in describing it as a general principle as 
early as 1967
20
.   Moreover, in accordance with its importance in common law systems, it had 
been translated into the American Bill of Rights as a constitutional protection for the citizen.  
But it did not feature in the Convention.  Its first appearance in an international Convention 
was in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966.  Article 14(7) 
provides: 
„14(7) No-one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he 
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedures of each country.‟ 
34. That is an unqualified provision, which reflects the importance of the principle.  We are 
aware that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has „glossed‟ the principle, in its 
commentary on the Covenant
21
 (but we are not aware on what authority it has done so).  No 
                                                 
20
 ECJ,15 March 1967, joined cases 18 and 35/65, Gutmann v Commission of the EAEC. 
21
 „In considering State reports differing views have often been expressed as to the scope of paragraph 7 of 
Article 14.  Some States parties have even felt the need to make reservations in relation to procedures for the 
resumption of criminal cases.;  It seems to the Committee that most States parties make a clear distinction 
between a resumption of a trial justified by exceptional circumstances and a retrial prohibited pursuant to the 
principle of ne bis in idem as contained in paragraph 7.  This understanding  of the meaning of ne bis in idem 
may encourage States parties to reconsider their reservations to Article 14, paragraph 7.‟ (General comment 
13(21), para 19. 
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doubt the reservations which gave rise to the Committee‟s comment were reflected in 
Protocol 7 to the European Convention, Article 4 of which provides: 
„4(1) No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence 
for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 
(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the 
reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or 
newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in 
the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the 
case. 
(3) No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of 
the Convention.‟ 
35. The question of possible „fundamental defect‟ in the original proceedings might well be 
thought to cast doubt on whether those proceedings could be said to be a proper trial for the 
application of the ne bis in idem principle.  But where a criminal case has reached its 
conclusion, after any appeals and retrials allowed for by the criminal justice system 
concerned, it is difficult to see any logical distinction between the “reopening” of a case in 
the light of „new or newly discovered facts‟ – which is permissible –  and a simple retrial in 
the light of new or newly discovered facts – which is not!   
36. It might accordingly be said that the formulation of Article 4(2) effectively negates the 
protection afforded by Article 4(1).  And the ECtHR has itself sought to limit the application 
of Article 4(2).  In Radchikov v Russia
22
 the Presidium of the Supreme Court in Russia had 
allowed a prosecution request for a „supervisory review‟ of an acquittal in the light of what 
were described as „various deficiencies in the prosecution case file‟.  The ECtHR held that 
prosecution (or court) errors did not justify the use of Article 4(2): 
„---The Court considers that the mistakes or errors of the state authorities should serve 
to the benefit of the defendant.  In other words, the risk of any mistake made by the 
prosecuting authority, or indeed a court, must be borne by the state and the errors 
must not be remedied at the expense of the individual concerned.‟  
37. The United Kingdom has neither signed nor ratified Protocol 7 (and a number of other 
Council of Europe states
23
 have not ratified it).  Statutes providing for exceptions to the rule 
against double jeopardy have been passed in England and Wales
24
 and in Scotland
25
.  While 
the English Act expressly defines „new evidence‟ (very broadly) as evidence not led in the 
                                                 
22
 ECtHR 24 May 2007, Case no. 65582/01, Radchikov v Russia). 
23
 Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and Turkey (as at 15
th
 September 2011). 
24
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c.44) Part 10. 
25





, both the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions have 
undertaken not to seek a retrial on the basis of evidence which was, or could with ordinary 
application have been made, available at the time of the original trial.  The Scottish definition 
reflects the ECtHR‟s ruling in the Radchikov case (cit. sup.). 
38. The approach of the European Court of Justice and, latterly, the Union to the principle 
of ne bis in idem has been different.  As mentioned above, the first case in which the question 
arose was Gutmann v Commission of the EAEC
27
 , in which the Commission sought to re-
open disciplinary proceedings against a Mr Gutmann, an employee of theirs.  He claimed that 
these proceedings violated the principle of non bis in idem.  The Court agreed: 
39. „In the light of the facts of this case, the possibility cannot be excluded that two 
disciplinary proceedings have been initiated on the basis of the same set of facts known to the 
Commission at the opening of the earlier proceedings, and founded on the same complaint.---
-As a result, the decision [ordering a further disciplinary inquiry to be held] must be 
annulled‟. (at pages 66-67) 
40. This was a decision based purely upon the legal principle that no-one should be tried 
twice for the same offence.  It was not based, as were later decisions, upon respect for the 
principles of free movement.   
41. When the Schengen Agreement was entered into, it contained an article, 54, which 
encapsulated the principle of ne bis in idem in the following terms: 
„54. A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may 
not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same acts provided that, if a 
penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the process of being 
enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting 
Party.‟ 
42. In a number of decisions the ECJ has emphasised the importance of the principle in 




43. The Charter, in Article 1, provides that: 
„1. Human dignity is inviolable.  It must be respected and protected.‟  
                                                 
26
 S.78(2) „Evidence is new if it was not adduced in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted----‟. 
27
 Joined cases 18 and 35/65. 
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judgment in a Member State, he may travel within the Schengen territory without fear of prosecution in another 




44. The right in the Charter is based upon European law.29  There is no equivalent right in 
the Convention.  But the ECtHR has developed an extended content for the right to private 
life set out in Article 8.  And there is a provision – Article 7 – in the Charter which also deals 
with respect for private and family life, and which is almost identical with Article 8 of the 
Convention.  In the absence of any proper consideration of Article 1 CFR by a competent 
court, its scope must remain uncertain.  In particular, it is not clear how far respect for and 
protection of human dignity can be regarded as a concept separate from the general right to 
and respect for private life which is enjoined by Article 8 of the Convention.  Certainly, in the 
UK, some courts adopt an approach to Article 8 ECHR which clearly encompasses the 
concept of dignity.  Thus, in the case of Napier v The Scottish Ministers
30
, the petitioner, who 
was a prisoner on remand in a Scottish prison, complained about the conditions in which he 
was held, averring that they amounted to a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the 
Convention or, if not under Article 3, then under Article 8.  
45. The judge (Lord Bonomy) observed: 
„It is my opinion that, as a result[of the regime to which he was subjected], the 
petitioner suffered psychological symptoms which anyone might experience as a 
reaction to the conditions in which he was detained – shame, disgust, loss of self 
esteem, low mood, anxiety, tension and anger-----‟(at paragraph 37.) 
46. His Lordship went to find that these conditions constituted a breach of the petitioner‟s 
rights under Article 3.  He considered the question of a possible breach of Article 8 in the 
event that he was found (by the Appeal Court) to be wrong in that conclusion, and went on to 
find: 
„It is plain that the detention of the petitioner in the squalid conditions which I have 
recounted, taken together with subjecting him to the regime of slopping out as it 
affected his routine, necessary, personal activities amounts, on the face of it, to an 
infringement of Article 8.‟ (at paragraph 79) 
47. The features of the regime to which the petitioner was subjected were, in his Lordship‟s 
view, clearly such as to deprive him of his ordinary dignity 
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48. The point was made even more clearly in Campbell v MGN Ltd31, in which Lord 
Hoffman, in the course of a discussion about developments in the law of confidence in 
England and Wales, observed: 
„What human rights law has done is to identify private information as something 
worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity.-------Instead of the 
cause of action being based upon the duty of good faith applicable to confidential 
personal information and trade secrets alike, it focuses upon the protection of human 
autonomy and dignity – the right to control the dissemination of information about 
one‟s private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people.‟ (at 
paragraphs 50-51)  
49. If these developments are taking place in the context of Article 8 ECHR, what empty 
space is there for Article 1 CFR to occupy?  The gap – if there was a gap – left by the absence 
of a specific reference to dignity,  has been filled by the courts.  
 
Q 2 What is the role of general legal principles: can they function as sources of fundamental 
rights protection? 
 
50. Leaving aside the subject of the difference, within the Charter, between „rights‟ and 
„principles‟, it would be possible to answer the question, shortly, in the affirmative.  It is 
certainly the case that some general principles have the effect of securing protection of 
human rights.  It is equally the case that not all general principles do so.  And there is 
difficulty, sometimes, in distinguishing between a general principle which serves to protect 
fundamental human rights, and which must on that account be preserved from alteration or 
diminution, and a general principle which merely reflects the views of society at the time it 
was put into place, and whose continuance or otherwise is not of great moment.   
51. More generally, however, the question poses difficulties from the perspective of the 
United Kingdom, because of our particular constitutional arrangements.  Common law 
systems tend to evolve general principles by way of successive court decisions to the same 
effect.  And, as noted, supra, in the Introduction, the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament has made it difficult to say that any such principle, whether derived from common 
law or statute, is fundamental, in the sense either of being immutable, or of being capable of 
protection in the courts in the face of a contrary statute.   
                                                 
31
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52. That said, the example given in the Explanation, of a right to good administration, is an 
excellent instance of a modern principle which has been developed by the courts in the 
United Kingdom into something which may perhaps be described as a fundamental right.  
During and following the Second World War, British Governments adopted a much more 
interventionist approach to public administration.  Primary legislation empowered Ministers 
to make administrative decisions, and to promote detailed regulations, over a wide range of 
policy matters.  In light of these developments the courts themselves developed rules which 
looked not so much at the merits of the decisions being made, but at the manner in which 
they were made, and whether those affected had had an appropriate opportunity to comment 
upon what was proposed before it took effect.  While there remain some differences between 
Scotland and England, the rules are broadly the same in each jurisdiction, and have reached a 
considerable degree of sophistication.  It would be difficult for any Government, in modern 
times, and in the face of opposition from the media and from pressure groups, to reverse these 
developments by legislation.  But there is no formal statement in statute law as to the kind of 
right set out in Article 41 CFR. 
53. An example the other way is the principle of ne bis in idem, or the rule against double 
jeopardy, which we have already discussed.  This was established, separately, in both 
Scotland and England, at common law, that is to say, by rulings of the courts (made 
sometimes in the face of considerable opposition from the Crown (the Executive)).  In each 
jurisdiction it developed over centuries into what might well have been described as a 
„fundamental right‟ of the citizen.  But, in each jurisdiction, it was very largely removed, or at 
least emasculated, by a single Act of the relevant Parliament
32
.  (It would, for example, be 
much less easy to make a similar change in the right against double jeopardy in the United 
States Bill of Rights, because any alteration to the Constitution is procedurally and politically 
difficult to achieve.)   
54. Further, the “general principles” are not the same in each jurisdiction.  This is perhaps 
not entirely surprising from a philosophical point of view, given the separate development of 
the systems of law in Scotland and England, but it nevertheless produces some interesting 
contrasts.  The right to trial by jury is certainly a fundamental principle of English law, 
deriving from Magna Carta in 1216.  It gives the citizens of England the right to trial by their 
peers.  The result is that even offences which may be thought to be relatively trivial or 
unimportant can be and are tried by juries.   
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55. There is no such right in Scotland.  A sheriff (a professional judge below the most 
senior level of court) sitting without a jury, and deciding himself on the guilt or innocence of 
the accused person, can impose a sentence of up to 12 months.  Essentially, the decision as to 
whether to bring a prosecution before a court including a jury is made by the prosecutor, on 
the basis of how long a sentence the accused is liable to get if convicted.  The accused 
himself has no right to demand trial by jury. 
56. We should add that the principle is no longer immutable even in the UK systems which 
more or less follow the English practice.  During the period of extensive terrorist activity in 
Northern Ireland, trials for even the most serious offences were routinely held before a judge 
sitting alone,   Even apart from that, in England, there is now provision for a trial to be held 
before a judge sitting alone, where there are reasons to believe that the jury has been 
tampered with.  And, for the purposes of the trial of the Lockerbie suspects was, the High 
Court of Justiciary sat, in the Netherlands, as a court of three judges, and without a jury. 
57. Finally, the Explanation mentions procedural measures which can have the effect of 
securing fundamental rights.  That is a common approach.  The recent judgment of the 
ECtHR in the case of Salduz v Turkey
33
 has effectively brought to an end the practice, set out 
in primary legislation in Scotland, whereby the police were able to interview a suspected 
person outwith the presence of his legal adviser, before formally charging him with an 
offence.  The fundamental right which the Court was purporting to protect was the right to 
remain silent, and not to be required to incriminate oneself, which the Court has developed 
into a right to have legal advice before being asked any questions as to an alleged offence.  
Clearly in any situation where an accused person is alone in custody there is a risk that he 
will be put under undue pressure to confess to a crime.  The solution, in Scotland, was to 
require all such interviews to be taped and videoed, so that there was an accurate record, 
available for the trial court, of what had occurred.  The procedural requirements of taping and 
filming the interview secured the fundamental right which was to be protected 
 
Q 3 To what extent is „horizontal effect‟ of fundamental rights accepted in the Member 
States? How is the case law of the ECJ in this respect received? 
 
58. Before answering the question we should point out that by „vertical effect‟ we mean the 
application of fundamental rights in disputes between private parties and the state (public 
authorities) and by „horizontal effect‟ we mean the application of fundamental rights in 
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disputes between private parties.  „Direct horizontal effect‟ means that parties to a private law 
dispute can directly rely on fundamental rights as a cause of action whereas „indirect 
horizontal effect‟ describes a situation where existing remedies are interpreted or developed 
in accordance with fundamental rights. 
59. We will focus on the law in the United Kingdom as it currently stands.  The entry into 
force of the HRA has led to significant changes in the way the courts deal with collisions of 
human rights.  The HRA transposed the ECHR into domestic law, making it directly 
applicable in proceedings before the courts in the UK.  Before the HRA entered into force in 
October 2000, there was no codified catalogue of human rights in the law of the UK.  Instead, 
individuals could rely on so-called residual liberties, which allowed them to do whatever was 
not forbidden by the law.  Naturally, these liberties did not enjoy a specifically protected 
status.
34
  Constitutionally, the HRA is „only‟ an Act of Parliament and could thus be repealed 
at any time.  However, the HRA, as we have noted in the Introduction, disposes of some 
specific features: it is not subject to the doctrine of implied repeal
35
, courts are under an 
obligation to interpret legislation „as far as possible‟ in a way which is compatible with the 
ECHR
36
 and where this is impossible higher courts can issue a declaration of 
incompatibility.
37
  According to section 6, the HRA binds „core public authorities‟ directly in 
everything they do and „hybrid public authorities‟ wherever they perform functions of a 
public nature.  „Core public authorities‟ characteristically carry out functions of 
government.
38
  „Hybrid public authorities‟ only occasionally carry out such functions.39  The 
HRA is silent regarding its impact on private law.  But it is clear from section 6 HRA that 
there is no direct horizontal effect of the rights contained in the ECHR as private parties are 
not mentioned as being bound by the HRA.
40
  However, the HRA explicitly provides that 
courts and tribunals are public authorities which means that even when deciding private law 
disputes, they are bound by the HRA.
41
  It is axiomatic that they must therefore comply with 
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the procedural requirements laid down in the ECHR.  But legal practice has shown that their 
obligations as public authorities go further (1) by obliging them to interpret private law 
statutes in accordance with the ECHR and (2) by obliging them to develop the common law 
in line with ECHR requirements.  This leads to an indirect horizontal effect of the rights 
contained in the ECHR.  A claimant can thus rely on existing remedies found either in 
statutes or at common law which the courts have to interpret or develop in accordance with 
the fundamental rights laid down in the Convention.   
60. An example of the application of section 3 HRA, which obliges courts to interpret Acts 
of Parliament in accordance with the ECHR, is the House of Lords case of Ghaidan v Godin-
Mendoza.
42
  The plaintiff was the surviving same sex partner of a deceased tenant.  He 
claimed that he should be allowed to stay in the rented flat as a „statutory tenant‟.  The 
problem was that the right to become the „statutory tenant‟ was only given to surviving 
spouses under the Rent Act 1977.  The applicant argued that this was discriminatory and thus 
in violation of Article 14 ECHR taken together with Article 8 ECHR.  The House of Lords 
agreed.  It is interesting that the House of Lords was willing to interpret the Rent Act 1977 
beyond the literal meaning of the words used in the Act.  The Act speaks of „the surviving 
spouse‟.  Speaking on whether it was „possible‟ under section 3 HRA to interpret these words 
to include a surviving partner of a homosexual relationship, Lord Nicholls argued that 
section 3 was not limited to resolving ambiguities in the wording of Acts.  The interpretative 
obligation decreed by section 3 was of an „unusual and far-reaching character‟.  Since the 
interpretation in accordance with the Convention did not have any other ramifications but to 
allow the claimant to stay in the flat as a statutory tenant and fell within the social policy 
objectives pursued by the Rent Act 1977, the House of Lords found for the claimant.  In 
contrast, the limits of section 3 are exceeded where an interpretation in accordance with the 
HRA would have far-reaching ramifications beyond the actual question before the court, 
which are ill-suited for determination by the courts.
43
  This was held to be the case by the 
House of Lords in Bellinger v Bellinger regarding the question whether a man who had 
undergone gender reassignment surgery could be treated as a woman for the purpose of 
marriage to a man.  The House of Lords felt that the implications of holding that this should 
be the case would be too far-reaching for it to decide and issued a declaration of 
incompatibility instead. 
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61. The prime example of the courts‟ duty to develop the common law in accordance with 
the requirements of the HRA is the development of the protection of privacy against intrusion 
by the press in recent years.  The courts developed the tort of breach of confidence into a 
forceful cause of action.
44
  In the case of Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. a 
famous model sought an injunction preventing publication of her treatment for drug 
addiction.
45
  Lord Nicholls explicitly stated that there was no over-arching, all-embracing 
cause of action for „invasion of privacy‟ in English law.  But the cause of action of breach of 
confidence had been developed to protect aspects of privacy.  The case of Campbell 
concerned the wrongful use of private information.  Under the common law as it existed 
before the HRA, Campbell would not have had great chances of success.  For instance, in 
Kaye v Robertson the Court of Appeal could not find a cause of action to prevent the 
defendant from publishing photographs taken of a famous actor in his hospital room where he 
was recovering from a serious accident.
46
  The Court (per Glidewell LJ) stated that there was 
no right of action for breach of a person‟s privacy.  Campbell shows that the introduction of 
the HRA has changed that.  Lord Nicholls explicitly recognised that breach of confidence 
now recognised the values enshrined in Article 8 and 10 ECHR.  Addressing the question of 
horizontality, he held that these values were as much applicable in disputes between private 
parties as in disputes between individuals and a public authority.  The House of Lords was 
not unanimous on whether there was an invasion of the applicant‟s privacy or not.  The 
majority held that the information in issue was private and confidential.  Lord Hope 
distinguished between reports about the applicant‟s drug addiction as such, which he 
considered to be justified since the model had previously lied about her addiction.  But 
regarding reports about her treatment, he considered the information to have been private 
since disclosure would be objectionable.  The crucial test for him was what a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same position as the 
claimant and faced with the same publicity.  But this alone was not sufficient to establish a 
breach of confidence.  A balance needed to be struck with the competing right to free speech 
contained in Article 10 ECHR.  Lord Hope proposed a test of proportionality stating:  
„They are whether publication of the material pursues a legitimate aim and whether 
the benefits that will be achieved by its publication are proportionate to the harm that 
may be done by the interference with the right to privacy.‟   
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Attaching „good weight‟ to the fact that reports and photographs about Campbell‟s drug 
treatment might harm her, Lord Hope (and the majority of the House) came to the conclusion 
that there was an infringement of the right to privacy.  It is important to note that in such 
cases there is no ranking of rights despite the existence of section 12 HRA, which gives some 
special protection in Article 10 cases where interim relief is sought.  But this does not 
prejudice the balancing exercise carried out in cases such as Campbell.   
62. An important aspect of the law of privacy recently appeared in the discussion about so-
called „super injunctions‟.  Such injunctions are a relatively recent development by the 
courts
47
 and some have been granted where the applicant tried to prevent publication of 
private information by the media.  Super-injunctions are defined as injunctions where the 
parties must remain anonymous and the existence of which may not be disclosed by anyone.  
Super-injunctions regularly made the headlines over the last few years sometimes resulting in 
Members of Parliament disclosing the existence of such injunctions in Parliament availing 
themselves of the protection afforded by parliamentary privilege.
48
  In response to the heated 
debates about them, a Committee on Super-Injunctions was established which delivered a 
report in May 2011 about their use.  The conditions for their admissibility were clarified by 
the Court of Appeal in the case of Ntuli v Donald.
49
  A member of a pop group had obtained a 
super-injunction in the High Court against a woman with whom he had had a relationship in 
order to restrain her from disclosing details of their relationship, especially sexually explicit 
details, to the press.  It was held by the Court of Appeal that the super-injunction was not 
necessary.  The musician‟s right to privacy would not have been adversely affected had the 
fact of the injunction been reported.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal also decided that 
anonymity was not necessary.  This shows that a strict necessity test needs to be carried out 
before a super-injunction can be granted.   
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Q 4 How do Member States within their respective jurisdictions and EU institutions deal with 
cases of the collision of rights, both as regards 
collisions between classic rights (e.g. non-discrimination and freedom of expression or 
religion etc.), and 
collisions between on the one hand classic rights and socio-economic and cultural rights on 
the other (e.g. free movement rights and freedom of expression, religion)  
collisions between socio-economic and cultural rights inter se (e.g. right to strike and free 
movement)? 
 
63. The answer to this question consists in a discussion of some relevant case law before 
the UK courts.  Not all of the collisions mentioned have come before the courts yet.  Since 
the courts in the United Kingdom are generally receptive towards the case law of the 
European Court of Justice it can be expected that the conflicts mentioned in the question 
would be resolved in a similar manner. 
Collisions between classic rights 
64. The answer to question 3 already contains an important example of how the courts 
approach conflicts between privacy and freedom of expression.  Thus we will focus on 
conflicts between non-discrimination law and other rights.  Non-discrimination legislation 
has recently been codified in the Equality Act 2010.  The cases referred to are mainly based 
on legislation preceding the Equality Act.  But since there have not been many substantive 
changes, it is still a good indicator of how the courts in the United Kingdom deal with 
discrimination cases.  The Equality Act 2010 is directly horizontally applicable in a number 
of relationships, most notably in employment law but also against schools, in some 
contractual relationships etc.   
65. Many contentious cases revolve around the conflict between non-discrimination law 
and freedom of religion.  The leading case in this respect is the Jewish Free School (JFS) 
case.
50
  In one of its first decisions, the majority of the newly formed UK Supreme Court 
found JFS‟s admissions policy to directly discriminate on the basis of ethnic origin thereby 
violating the Race Relations Act 1976.  The school‟s admissions policy favoured the 
admission of children who were recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi 
(OCR).  The OCR recognised them as Jewish if their mother was a Jew at the time of their 
birth.  A mother is considered to be Jewish either if her mother was Jewish or if she 
converted to Judaism in a manner recognised by the OCR.  Thus the admissions policy was 
based on matrilineal descent, which the majority of the Court found to constitute 
discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin.  The Court regarded the motive why the criterion 
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of matrilineal descent was adopted (which was undoubtedly for religious reasons) to be 
irrelevant for the question whether the unequal treatment of children whose mothers were 
Jewish and children whose mothers were not constituted discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity.
51
  This shows that under anti-discrimination law in the United Kingdom there is no 




66. In another case, Bristol County Court held the owners of a Bed and Breakfast to have 
directly discriminated against a same sex couple in a civil partnership by denying them 
occupation of a double room which they had pre-booked.  The reason for the refusal was that 
due to their religious convictions the owners only allowed married couples to stay in such a 
room.  In the eyes of the judge, the direct discrimination resulted in the unequal treatment of 
people in a marriage and people in a civil partnership which was unlawful under the Equality 
Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007
53
.  The judge also found an indirect discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.
54
  The defendants‟ attempt to justify their behaviour on the 
basis of their religious convictions was not accepted by the Court which argued that the 
Regulations were compatible with Article 9 ECHR since that right was not absolute. 
67. In a further case, a Catholic adoption agency (Catholic Care) appealed against a 
decision by the Charity Commission denying it permission to amend its rules in order to 
allow it to refuse to offer its adoption services to same sex couples.  The Charity Tribunal did 
not accede to the Charity‟s argument that it should be allowed to discriminate in this manner 
for religious reasons under an exception clause in the Equality Act 2010.
55
   
68. This short review of the case law shows that discrimination cannot normally be justified 
on the basis of religious belief.  The same is true mutatis mutandis for justifications based on 
freedom of expression.  As regards harassment on the basis of one of the characteristics 
protected by the Equality Act 2010
56
, there may be room for justification on the basis of 
freedom of expression or freedom of religion.  In order to constitute harassment for the 
purpose of the Act, the conduct must have the purpose or effect of violating the victim‟s 
dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile (etc.) environment.  The determination whether 
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such conduct leads to such an effect requires courts to balance competing rights such as 
freedom of expression.
57
   
Collisions between classic rights and socio-economic rights 
69. The case of Zagorski concerning a potential clash between free movement rights 
(freedom to export goods) and classic fundamental rights (right to life/right not to be 
subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment) was decided by the High Court.
58
  The 
plaintiff (on death row in the United States) applied for judicial review of a decision by the 
Secretary of State for Business not to ban the export of an anaesthetic which could be used 
for the plaintiff‟s execution in the United States.  The case thus involved a potential clash of 
rights.
59
  However, it was unsuccessful because the Judge did not find the Convention or the 
Charter applicable.
60
 We have identified a potential for conflict between the provisions on 
free movement of persons and the rule against double jeopardy (ne bis in idem).
61
  The threat 
of (renewed) criminal proceedings is capable of deterring EU citizens from exercising their 
free movement rights.  
Collisions between socio-economic and cultural rights 
As regards the last category of potential clashes (socio-economic v free movement rights), 
there is no case law available.  It should perhaps be noted that a free-standing (fundamental) 





).  Rather, it is only existent in so far as a lawful strike exempts a 
union from tortious liability which would otherwise result from it calling a strike.
64
   
 
Q 5 How does, or should, the balancing take place in the context of the multiplicity of EU, 
ECHR and national legal orders („multilevel‟ legal order)? 
 
70. The short answer to the question, as posed, is „cautiously‟.  The treatment of „classic‟, 
„cultural‟ and „socio-economic‟ rights differs from country to country, as a reflection of the 
their differing political and constitutional history and practices.  As we have tried to explain, 
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in relation to the protection of fundamental rights in relation to the criminal law, such 
protection will almost inevitably be a „package‟ of substantive law and procedural practice 
which combine to produce the desired result.  Where a supra-national body descends below 
the level of desirable generality, and fixes on one aspect of such a package as requiring to be 
changed, so as to meet some perceived general aim, it runs the risk of upsetting the balance of 
one or more of these individual „packages‟, with consequent difficulties for the system 
concerned.  The Scottish institutional writer on criminal law, Professor Hume, observed in 
1797, (when he was explaining why he was not minded to criticise aspects of the English 
criminal law): 
„In short, the whole train of proceedings in this or any other country, must be taken 
into consideration, in judging of any part.  And if upon a complex view of the entire 
process, the prisoner appears to have a fair and equitable trial, in which innocence 
runs no risk of being ensnared or surprised; it is all that a reasonable man can wish 
for, and all perhaps that is attainable to human wisdom.‟65 
71. We would accordingly hope that, so far as the „classic‟ rights are concerned, the 
domestic courts of the Member States will be allowed to balance the difficulties caused by 
the overlapping influences of competing rights in the context of their own legal systems.   
Where intervention by the ECJ or the ECtHR is thought to be unavoidable, then it should be 
limited to what is necessary, and with due regard to the difficulties which adverse judgments 
may cause to the administration concerned.  For example, in the case of Grzelczyk v Centre 
public d‟aide sociale d‟Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve66 a French student studying in Belgium 
sought payment of a non-contributory allowance entitlement to which was based on a 
nationality requirement limiting eligibility to Belgian nationals.  The Court persuaded itself 
that the relevant Directives did not preclude a French student from claiming the allowance.  
The Belgian Government asked the ECJ, in the event that it found that a foreign student was 
entitled to payment of the allowance, effectively to make the judgment prospective only, in 
light of the difficulty it would cause for the Belgian authorities if it were made retrospective.  
The Court felt able summarily to dismiss this claim, without suggesting that the Belgian 
Government had acted otherwise than in good faith, and without entering into any 
consideration of the real practical problems which a retrospective judgment would cause.  
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Q 6 What role does the legislature have in granting horizontal effect to fundamental rights?  
What is its role in ordering and prioritizing rights which might collide?  In particular, what 
is the influence of the non-discrimination Directives on the exercise of other fundamental 
rights in the Member States 
 
72. As noted in the answer to question 4, the United Kingdom has enacted a comprehensive 
Equality Act, which takes as its guiding principle a high level of protection against 
discrimination.  Accordingly, the question for UK courts tends to be formulated around 
consideration of whether other rights, such as the right to free expression, or the right to 
religious freedom (as was relevant in the Catholic Care case mentioned in the answer to 
question 4) have been affected in a manner going beyond what is permissible in terms of the 
Convention.  As shown by the Kalanke
67
  and Marschall
68
  cases, the effect of a rigorous 
interpretation and enforcement of non-discrimination legislation can create difficulties for 
Member States which wish to implement positive discrimination programmes.  
73. Equally, fundamental rights are sometimes prayed in aid to strike down what might 
otherwise have been regarded as legitimate legislative activity by Member States.  Thus, 
when the Flemish Government in Belgium set up a system of care insurance open to Belgians 
residing in the Dutch-speaking area and the area of Brussels-capital, and to persons living in 
another Member State and working in either of those areas, it was challenged on the grounds 
that it excluded persons residing in other areas of Belgium who worked in that area.
69
 The 
decision is mentioned below, in the answer to question 12, to demonstrate the areas where 
European law does not provide a remedy.  It is mentioned here to demonstrate how small that 
area is becoming.  The rationale for the ECJ‟s decision that the system was incompatible with 
the principle of freedom of movement was set out in paragraph 53 of the judgment: 
„53. In any event, it is not inconceivable, given such factors as the ageing of the 
population, that the prospect of not being able or unable to receive dependency 
benefits such as those offered by the care insurance scheme at issue in the main 
proceedings should be taken into consideration by the persons concerned in exercising 
their right to freedom of movement.‟ (emphasis added.) 
74. Similarly, the occasional tendency of the ECtHR to state general, universally applicable 
principles in judgments arising out of the particular circumstances of a case from a single 
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state can have an adverse effect on the detailed arrangements in other states, where the 
surrounding circumstances are quite different
70
.  
75. Finally, on this question, the supra-national legislatures are not well suited to the 
amendment of fundamental rights set out in their own legislation and, accordingly, tend to 
leave the detailed working out of the implications of general provisions to the courts.  
 
Q 7 Is the Charter perceived as being a mere continuation and consolidation of the previous 
(i.e. pre-Lisbon) sources of EU fundamental rights protection; or does the Charter provide 
added protection (or rights) as compared to the pre-Lisbon situation, if one looks at the case 
law in various jurisdictions since its entry into force? 
Q 8 Has the distinction made in the Charter, especially in its official Explanations Relating to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007/C 303/02), between „rights and freedoms‟ and 
„principles‟ been reflected in the practice of courts and legislatures in the respective 
jurisdictions, as well as in the doctrine? 
 
76. It will be convenient to answer both of these questions together, and we start by 
observing that there is little authority in the UK courts on the meaning of the Charter, 
although it has featured in at least one case.  In the Court of Session (the supreme civil court) 
in Scotland, a prisoner sought a judicial review of a decision not to place him on the electoral 
roll for local elections.
71
  He alleged, inter alia, that Article 20(2)(b) of the Treaty, read with 
Article 40 CFR, conferred upon him a fundamental EU right to vote in such elections.  The 
Court held that it was clear that the right to vote in local elections which was conferred by the 
Treaty only applied to such a right in a state other than the state of which the applicant was a 
national.  Accordingly, since the Charter applied to Member States only when implementing 
EU law, it had no application in the case.   
77. We turn now to some general comments on the interface between the Charter and the 
Convention.  As originally conceived, the Charter was a general statement of fundamental 
rights prepared without prejudice as to whether or how it should be inserted into the treaties.
72
  
When it was decided that it should be incorporated into the treaties, further work was 
necessary to turn it from an essentially political declaratory document into a legislative text.  
That took the form largely of additional provisions attempting to link some of the Articles of 
                                                 
70
 Cf. Salduz  v Turkey, cit. sup. 
71
 George McGeogh, application for judicial review, [2011] CSOH 65. 
72
 „There appears to be a need, at the present stage of the Union‟s development, to establish a Charter of 
fundamental rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to the Union’s 
citizens.-----It will then have to be considered whether and, if so, how the Charter should be integrated into the 




the Charter with some of the Articles of the Convention, and to distinguish between rights 
and freedoms, on the one hand, and principles, on the other.  In addition, a set of 
„Explanations‟ was prepared.  
78. The intention of these measures would appear to have been to secure that, in so far as it 
covered the same ground as the Convention, the Charter was indeed a „continuation and 
consolidation‟ of pre-Lisbon EU fundamental rights protection.  There is a question as to 
whether those measures will be found to have been successful. 
79. With regard to the rights which cover the same subject area as rights set out in the 
Convention, Article 52(3) CFR provides that „the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by the said Convention‟.  In that regard, it is unfortunate that, if 
that was indeed the policy intention of those drafting the Charter, they did not simply adopt 
the same wording.  As the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union pointed 
out, as long ago as 2000
73
: 
„The----Charter will rely heavily on the rights set out in the ECHR.------The ECHR is 
the „benchmark‟ standard of human rights protection in Europe, and the Charter 
should reflect this.  We cannot, however, emphasise too strongly the need for the text 
of the Charter to avoid paraphrasing or revising the ECHR.  Rewording the ECHR 
guarantees would run the risk of confusion, as it would open the door to re-
interpretation of existing ECHR guarantees based upon the new wording.  At the level 
of the individual, it would only confuse and mislead if the Charter were to do 
anything other than restate the ECHR‟s provisions in full including their 
qualifications and exceptions.‟ 
80. It is of course a general principle of statutory interpretation that where two provisions 
are expressed in different terms, it is almost invariably because they are intended to convey 
different meanings and effects.  So it remains to be seen whether a combination of Article 
52(3) and the Explanations can overcome the fact that what are said to be the same concepts 
are expressed in different terms.  And in some cases there are already acknowledged to be 
differences, even on the face of the Charter, the Convention and the Explanations.   
81. Thus, Article 47 CFR (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) might be thought, 
by virtue of Article 52(3) CFR, to correspond to Articles 13 and 6 ECHR.  But, according to 
the Explanations, that is not so.  In particular, the reference to „civil rights and obligations‟ in 
Article 6 of the Convention is not carried across into Union law, where protection is not so 
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limited.  This is an example, according to the Explanations, where the protection afforded to 
the individual by Union law is more extensive than that envisaged by the Convention.  So, 
although Article 47 CFR looks as if it re-states the same principle as is covered by Articles 6 
and 13 ECHR, it in fact provides wider protection to the individual. 
82. We turn to a case in which the converse appears to apply.  In relation to the principle of 
ne bis in idem, which we have already discussed, the differences are even more marked.  
Article 50 CFR is a simple prohibition on retrial where a person has already been acquitted or 
convicted „within the Union‟.  It goes further, in its terms, than Article 54 of the Schengen 
Convention.  It goes much further than the Convention provision on the same subject, Article 
4 of Protocol 7, which, as discussed above, effectively enables retrials to take place in the 
light of new evidence.  The rationale for Article 54 of the Schengen Convention was not only 
the broad public interest in finality of legal proceedings, and in securing a person who had 
been tried once from the strain of a further trial.  It also took account of the consideration that 
the possibility of a retrial in another Member State would interfere with the principle of 
freedom of movement.  We would therefore suggest that this is another case where Union law 
already goes further than the Convention does, and that Article 50 CFR accurately reflects 
that intention.  If that is correct, the provisions of Article 50 CFR may well be a continuation 
and consolidation of existing EU law, but they do not „correspond‟ to the Convention 
provisions on the same subject. 
83. We note in passing that the ECJ too is conscious of the implications of differences in 
wording between the Convention and the Charter.  In J McB v LE,
74
, the Court observed: 
„Moreover, it follows from Article 52(3) of the Charter that, in so far as the Charter 
contains rights which correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning 
and scope are to be the same as those laid down by the ECHR.  However, that 
provision does not preclude the grant of wider protection by European Union law.  
Under Article 7 of the Charter, „[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications‟.  The wording of Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR is identical to that of the said Article 7, except that it uses the expression 
„correspondence‟ instead of „communications‟.  That being so, it is clear that the 
said Article 7 contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) 
of the ECHR.  Article 7 of the Charter must therefore be given the same meaning 
                                                 
74
 ECJ 5 October 2010, Case C-400/10 PPU, J McB v LE. 
  
29 
and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the European 
Court of Human Rights.‟75 (emphasis added) 
84. The second point we would make is that it seems likely that the protection afforded by 
EU law is going to drift, or be driven, further from the legal position under the Convention, 
even in areas where the rights protected by both documents do in fact correspond.  We would 
refer to the European Commission‟s Impact Assessment76accompanying a Proposal for a 
Directive on the right to information in criminal proceedings.  That proposal is one of the 
measures envisaged by the Roadmap agreed by the Council in 2009
77
, and at paragraph 3.2 
the Commission states: 
„The Roadmap points the way for EU action and gives the Commission a mandate to 
act on a series of measures which, taken together, will create a high standard of 
fundamental rights going well beyond the protection currently offered by Arts 5 and 6 
ECHR.  Taking this course will also give a specific EU meaning to the fair trial 
safeguards  enshrined in Arts 47 and 48 CFREU.‟ 
85. As at September 2011, when this paper is being drafted, the proposed Directive already 
contains provisions which would require the UK jurisdictions to provide more information to 
the defence than is required under existing UK law, or under the Convention. 
86. In relation to „principles‟ and „rights‟, we note that the Explanations attempt to 
distinguish them so as to differentiate those rights entitlement to which is set out in the 
Charter, and those which require further legislative action before they become enforceable.  
Broadly, the latter class includes those mentioned in Chapter IV of the Charter.  So far as we 
are aware, no case turning on the distinction has yet been argued in a UK court. 
87. Finally, we turn to Protocol 3078.  The United Kingdom government has not claimed 
that the Protocol in any way exempts the UK from its obligations under the Charter.  Indeed, 
that would be an odd proposition.  In form, and indeed in substance, the Protocol is a 
statement agreed by all the Member States as to the effect of the Charter on Poland and the 
UK.  It contains no amendment to the Charter in relation to those two states.  It simply re-
states three general provisions as to the application of the Charter.  The first is that the 
Charter does not extend the ability of the ECJ – or of any other court – to find that the laws 
etc. of the UK are inconsistent with the fundamental rights which the Charter re-affirms.  
That is already the position set out in Article 51(2).  Second, the Protocol clarifies that the 
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principles set out in Chapter IV of the Charter will require further legislative action before 
they become justiciable.  That is already set out in Article 52(5).  Third, the Protocol clarifies 
that where the Charter refers to national laws and practices, that has effect, in relation to the 
UK, to the laws and practices of the UK.  Again, this seems an unexceptionable statement of 
what might otherwise have been thought to be obvious. 
88. We would therefore suggest that the legal effect of the Protocol, albeit couched in terms 
applicable only to Poland and the UK, is actually to spell out provisions which would apply 
just as much to every other Member State of the Union. 
89. Whether the analysis set out above is correct is still a matter for conjecture: the full 
implications of the Protocol have not yet been established authoritatively.  Certainly, in the 
political discussion after its adoption the Protocol was sometimes referred to as an „opt-out‟ 
of the Charter.  This view seems to have been adopted by a judge in the High Court of 
England and Wales, who stated that: 
„[g]iven the […] Protocol, the Charter cannot be relied on as against the United 
Kingdom […]‟.79   
90. The Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference in the case to the Court of Justice 
inter alia asking about the relevance of the UK/Polish Protocol.
80
 But it is interesting to note 
that the UK government‟s representative before the Court of Appeal argued that the High 
Court Judge erred in its assessment, stating that „the purpose of the Protocol is not to prevent 
the Charter from applying to the United Kingdom, but to explain its effect‟.81  Most 
commentators agree that Article 1(1) of that Protocol does not have any effect on the ECJ‟s 
jurisdiction to find UK law to be inconsistent with the rights contained in the Charter since 
the wording of that Article is limited in that it only provides that the jurisdiction of the ECJ is 
not extended.
82
  However, should the ECJ find that the Protocol is a full opt-out of the 
Charter, the EU‟s traditional unwritten fundamental rights would continue to bind the UK as 




                                                 
79
 Per Cranston, J., High Court, R (on the application of Saeedi) v Secreatary of State for the Home Department 
[2010] EWHC 705 (Admin), para 155.   
80
 ECJ pending Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 
81
 Quoted in [2010] EWCA Civ 990. 
82
 Cf. P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (OUP 2010) p. 239;  C. Barnard, „The „Opt-Out‟ for the United Kingdom and 
Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?‟, in: S. Griller and J. Ziller 
(eds.), The Lisbon Treaty (Springer 2008) p. 257 at pp. 266-268. 
83
 Cf. ECJ 13 July 1988, Case 5/88 Wachauf v Germany; ECJ 18 June 1991, C-260/89 ERT. 
  
31 
Preliminary remarks on questions 9 to 14: 
91. Questions 9-14 mainly address very recent or even future developments.  It was 
therefore difficult to find country-specific material and thus to give answers with a focus on 
the specific situation of United Kingdom.  Where we were unable to base our answers on 
developments in the United Kingdom, we have given our own views on the questions.   
 
Q 9 Does EU accession to the ECHR overall add to the protection of fundamental rights of 
citizens; does it outweigh the procedural complications to which it may give rise, for instance 
when the EU is co-respondent, and more especially when a prior involvement of the ECJ in a 
case pending at the ECtHR would become possible? 
 
92. Before answering the two questions, it should be pointed out that the United Kingdom‟s 
approval to the accession Treaty will not be subjected to a so-called „referendum lock‟ under 
the European Union Act 2011.  In a nutshell, the European Union Act 2011 subjects every 
further transfer of competences on the EU to a referendum.  Section 10 of the Act makes it 
clear, however, that the government may give its approval to the accession agreement under 
Article 218 (8) TFEU once the agreement has passed through Parliament.  This means that a 
referendum will not be necessary.   
93. Overall, it is suggested that EU accession to the Convention will add to the protection 
of fundamental rights of people in the EU (whether they are EU citizens or not).  The main 
innovation will be that the EU will become directly accountable in Strasbourg.  Under the 
current state of the ECtHR‟s case law an individual can hold one or more Member States 
responsible as proxies where she alleges that a violation of her Convention rights can be 
found either in the EU‟s Treaties (primary law)84 or in actions of the Member States required 
by EU law.
85
  This approach will no longer be necessary.  But what is more important than 
ironing out this procedural peculiarity, is that accession will close a gap in the ECtHR‟s 
jurisdiction to (indirectly) review EU law.  This gap exists in cases where there was no 
Member State action but only action by the EU‟s institutions, e.g. the European Commission.  
In such cases, the violation cannot be attributed to the Member States as it did not occur 
within their jurisdiction as required by Article 1 ECHR.
86
  Since the EU cannot at present be 
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a respondent in Strasbourg, there is no external human rights review.  This gap would thus be 
closed in the event of the EU‟s accession to the Convention.87   
94. A further point is whether accession would affect the position of the Convention in the 
UK‟s legal order adding to the human rights protection already existent in the UK.88  The UK 
Government stated in an Explanatory Memorandum that it did not expect accession to have 
any direct impact on UK law arguing that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Convention already constitute general principles of EU law.
89
  This view is largely correct.  It 
should, however, be added that the main source of fundamental rights in the EU is now the 
Charter, which is of relevance to the Member States when „implementing EU law‟.90  It is 
submitted that the Convention, which after accession would become an integral part of EU 
law, would be applicable under the same preconditions as the Charter.  Thus as far as the 
Charter is applicable, accession would not substantially add to the protection of fundamental 
rights within the EU, i.e. before the national courts of the Member States or before the ECJ.  
95. Turning to the procedural complications an accession may bring, the main problem in 
this respect would certainly be the introduction of the co-respondent mechanism.  This 
mechanism might potentially lead to problems at three stages of the proceedings before the 
ECtHR: (1) the designation of a co-respondent; (2) the prior involvement of the ECJ; (3) the 
allocation of responsibility after the ECtHR‟s judgment.   
96. Regarding the designation of the co-respondent, there are few procedural complications 
to be expected.  Importantly, the draft agreement provides that the admissibility of an 
application would be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent.
91
  This 
means that only when a case has been declared admissible will the ECtHR consider the 
question of a co-respondent.  This is significant since most cases before the ECtHR are struck 
out at this stage so that there will be only few cases in practice in which the co-respondent 
mechanism will be applicable.  Where the case is admissible, the EU or a Member State as 
the case may be, may ask the Court to join proceedings.  It is entirely within the discretion of 
the co-respondent to join the proceedings or not.  If a party to the Convention expresses its 
wish to join proceedings as a co-respondent, the Court is restricted to carrying out a 
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  The Court may deny the status of co-respondent only in cases where it is 
implausible that it appears that the allegations call into question the compatibility with the 
Convention of a provision of secondary EU law or of primary EU law.
93
  It is likely that the 
Court will deem these conditions to be met in every case where the applicant argues the 
incompatibility of EU law with the Convention.  Thus proceedings which would be open for 
a co-respondent would be relatively easily identifiable. 
97. The prior involvement of the ECJ might prove more problematic in procedural terms.  
A prior involvement is foreseen in cases where the EU has become co-respondent and where 
the ECJ has not yet assessed the compatibility of the relevant provision of EU law with the 
Convention rights at issue.  This assessment is easily made where the ECJ has not at all 
spoken in a given case, i.e. where it was not involved by way of a request for a preliminary 
ruling under Article 267 TFEU.
94
  But where the ECJ was involved, the ECtHR would have 
to consider whether the ECJ pronounced on whether EU law was compatible with the 
Convention.  In some cases, the ECJ may not have made such an assessment because the 
referring domestic court did not ask it to do so.  In other cases, the ECJ may have assessed 
the compatibility of a provision with fundamental rights, but maybe not with all the rights 
which the applicant argues the provision allegedly violates.  Thus the ECtHR may be 
required to conduct an in-depth analysis of the ECJ‟s ruling, especially because the ECJ will 
not normally base its findings on the Convention but on the Charter.  Thus it might 
sometimes prove difficult to assess whether the „Convention rights at issue‟ were decided 
upon (e.g. where  „corresponding rights‟ are concerned95).   
98. An even greater procedural complication in connection with the prior involvement of 
the ECJ will be the determination of the correct procedure before it.  Who should instigate 
such a procedure?  Would the ECJ have to decide under an accelerated procedure provided 
for in Article 23a of its Statute every time or would it be in the ECJ‟s discretion whether it 
does so?  It is clear from the draft agreement that as long as the ECJ has not pronounced, the 
proceedings before the ECtHR would have to be stayed.  This is prone to lead to considerable 
delays unless the accelerated procedure was used.  Finally, it is not at all clear how the 
ECtHR would have to deal with a finding by the ECJ that there was a violation of the 
Convention resulting in the ECJ declaring the EU act in question to be invalid.  Would such a 
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finding automatically deprive the applicant of her victim status?  An argument against this is 
that the domestic court‟s decision still stands as res judicata.  This means that for the case to 
become inadmissible in Strasbourg, there would have to be a reaction at Member State level, 
e.g. a reopening of the domestic procedure.  This would have to be legislated for in each 
Member State. 
99. The final procedural complication we can envisage is the allocation of responsibility 
between the EU and the Member State where the application to the ECtHR was successful.  If 
the ECtHR were to make such an assessment it might be in violation of the autonomy of the 
EU‟s legal order as established by the ECJ.96  Thus from the point of view of EU law, the 
assessment would have to be made in a procedure internal to the EU.  One option would be 
that the EU and its Member States agree to always share the costs of proceedings in which 
one of them is a co-respondent (including possible payments as „just satisfaction‟).  This 
would be an easy solution.  But if this route is not taken, there would have to be a second set 
of proceedings between EU and Member States in order to find out who is truly to blame for 
the human rights violation.  The ECJ would be an appropriate forum for this.  But it would 
cost additional time and money.  In any event, it should go without saying that after the 
ECtHR has found a violation, both respondent and co-respondent would be under an 
obligation to remove the violation (and to pay just satisfaction) no matter who is „truly‟ 
responsible.  Thus this stage of the proceedings would only be of interest to the EU and the 
Member States and should not affect the applicant in any way. 
 
Q 10 The ECtHR Bosphorus ruling exempts Member State action covered by EU law from 
scrutiny on the rebuttable assumption of an overall conformity of EU measures with the 
ECHR.  Is this „double standard‟ of review of Member State action, depending on whether it 
is determined autonomously or on the basis of EU law, justified and acceptable to all 
Member States? 
Have national courts followed the Bosphorus ruling in their case law when parties invoked 
the ECHR?  
Does the Bosphorus presumption have the overall effect of shifting the ultimate authority 
concerning the question whether ECHR rights have been infringed from Strasbourg to 
Luxembourg? 
Will the Bosphorus presumption be tenable, also in light of the purposes of accession to the 
ECHR? 
 
100. In order to give a meaningful answer to this question, an important clarification needs to 
be made.  The Bosphorus presumption only applies where the Member State was deemed not 
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to have had any discretion in implementing its obligations under EU law.  The rationale 
behind it is that where a Member State has no discretion it also has no opportunity to „add‟ to 
the violation of the Convention rooted in its EU law obligations.  Thus the EU Member State 
acted as if it were an executive organ of the EU.  This means that in such cases the violation 
is really attributable to the EU.  The Member State is only held responsible because the EU is 
not a party to the Convention so that there is some justification for letting the Member State 
„off the hook‟.  From the point of view of the applicant, however, this is unfortunate because 
he cannot hold the EU responsible in Strasbourg either so that there is no remedy under the 
ECHR for him in such cases.   
101. There are no official statements regarding the presumption by the UK government or 
other representatives.  But it is suggested that the United Kingdom has no objections to it.  
After all, it leads to its not being held responsible for (some) violations of the Convention 
rooted in EU law.  There is no evidence that national courts of the UK have used the 
presumption.  There is no reason to suggest that they should ever be in a position to do so.  If 
they are convinced that a piece of EU legislation violates the Convention they would be 
under an obligation to make a reference to the ECJ.
97
  They cannot opt to apply legislation 
which they believe to be in violation of the Convention save in the knowledge that the United 
Kingdom could not be held responsible in Strasbourg and that therefore their decision could 
not be challenged.  But if there were a case in which implementation of an EU obligation 
appeared to conflict with rights under the Convention, that would cause particular difficulties 
for the UK‟s devolved administrations, which „have no power‟ to do anything which is 
incompatible with EU obligations or Convention rights (cf the Introduction). 
102. Regarding the question of authority, it should be noted that there has not been a single 
case in which Strasbourg found a „manifest deficit‟ resulting in a rebuttal of the presumption 
in Bosphorus.  Thus the presumption has the practical effect of depriving the ECtHR from its 
jurisdiction to decide cases in which Member States had no discretion in implementing their 
obligations under EU law.  In addition, one might also consider cases for which Strasbourg 
has refused to accept jurisdiction outright.  These are cases in which there was no Member 
State action whatsoever, i.e. neither implementing action nor a preliminary reference by a 
national court.
98
  In practice this leads to the European Court of Human Rights having 
jurisdiction over fewer cases regarding violations of the Convention found in EU law.  Thus 
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it can be concluded that the ECtHR has relinquished some of its responsibility.  As a result, 
the final say on these matters now lies with the EU‟s judicial system but not necessarily with 
the ECJ alone.  The ECJ only has limited jurisdiction in such cases.  Where there is no 
Member State measure such jurisdiction is laid down in Article 263 (4) TFEU.
99
  And where 
there was implementing action by a Member State, the ECJ can only get involved via the 
preliminary reference procedure.  But there is no guarantee that a national court will actually 
make a reference.  The answer to the question should thus be that (to the extent that 
Bosphorus and other exceptions apply) the responsibility for the protection of human rights is 
vested in the EU legal system.  Whether one should speak of a „shift‟ in responsibility is not 




103. A completely open question is whether the ECtHR will continue to uphold Bosphorus 
after accession by the EU to the Convention.  There are good reasons to suggest that it should 
not.  But at the outset it should be noted that the rationale given by the ECtHR for granting 
the Union‟s legal order the Bosphorus privilege is a substantive one:  it is an 
acknowledgment that the protection of human rights in the European Union and by the ECJ is 
of such high quality that the ECtHR can afford to only exercise its jurisdiction where, 
exceptionally, the protection was manifestly deficient.  After the entry into force of the 
Charter, it can be argued that the protection has even become better.  Thus, one could contend 
that there are even fewer reasons for the ECtHR to abandon the presumption.
101
   
104. It is argued, however, that the true reasons for the presumption lie elsewhere.  The first 
is that the ECtHR wanted to show a degree of comity towards the European Court of 
Justice.
102
  It acknowledged that the ECJ has a monopoly to declare EU action invalid and 
that the EU, and with it the ECJ, is not formally bound by the Convention.  The ECtHR 
attempted to avoid a conflict with the ECJ and sent a signal of respect, in return for the ECJ‟s 
past receptiveness towards the ECtHR‟s human rights case law.103  The second reason for the 
Bosphorus presumption lies in the fact that the Member States, and not the EU, would be held 
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responsible for violations of the Convention.  The presumption is thus an acknowledgment of 
the fact that the EU, which in such cases is the potential violator of human rights, is not 
formally bound by the ECHR.
104
 
105. Once the EU is formally a party to the Convention, these two reasons no longer apply.  
As for comity, the European Court of Justice‟s decisions will now be subject to the scrutiny 
by the ECtHR.  By acceding to the Convention, the EU will have agreed to have its legal 
system measured by the human rights standards of the ECHR.  For the ECtHR, the ECJ will 
be a „domestic court‟ and therefore no longer deserve special treatment.105  Furthermore, the 
EU can now be a party to the proceedings before the ECtHR, at least as a co-respondent.  It 
will no longer be the case that the Member States have to act as sole respondents in lieu of 
the EU.  Therefore, there will no longer be a need for them to be privileged in cases currently 
covered by the presumption.
106
  In addition, a continuation of the Bosphorus case law would 
go against the very spirit of accession which is to increase the human rights protection for the 
individual. 
 
Q 11 Is the interpretation which the ECJ has so far given of the general provisions on the 
scope of the Charter, its relation to national constitutional rights and human rights treaties, 
and on restricting the exercise of rights (Title VII of the Charter) looked upon favourably? 
 
106. At the time of writing (September 2011), there were only a handful of cases decided by 
the ECJ with regard to Title VII of the Charter.  None of these cases has so far been 
commented upon in the academic discussion nor has any of these cases been referred to by 
the courts of the United Kingdom.  The relevant cases are DEB and McB.  In DEB the ECJ 
had to consider whether Article 47 CFR was broad enough to include a right to legal aid for 
legal persons and if so in what circumstances.
107
  The applicant company was applying for 
legal aid in order to establish state liability of the German state under EU law.  The Court 
referred to Article 51(1) CFR establishing that the Member States were only bound by its 
provisions when they are implementing EU law.  However, it did not explicitly make the link 
between that Article and the case before it.  It seems that the fact that the applicant was 
seeking state liability for a late implementation of a Directive by Germany was sufficient to 
satisfy Article 51 (1).  The other case mentioning Article 51 (1) was McB who sought to 
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establish that fathers had a right to custody to their children even if this is not automatically 
recognised in the family law of the Member State.  The Court only relied on the Charter when 
interpreting a Council Regulation and pointed to the limits of the reach of the Charter 
contained in Article 51 (2).
108
  Unfortunately, the ECJ did not expand on this question. 
107. Thus one of the most interesting open questions, under which circumstances the Charter 
is applicable to the Member States, has not been clarified.  Article 51 (1) states that it is only 
when Member States are „implementing‟ Union law.  The bone of contention in the literature 
is whether this should be read narrowly, i.e. only catching scenarios in which the Member 
States acted as agents of the Union (like in the Wachauf decision
109
) or whether a broader 
reading is appropriate, which would also capture cases in which Member States derogated 




  Closely linked to that issue, is the question in how far 
Article 51(2) CFR limits its scope.  That provision states that the Charter does not extend the 
field of application of EU law beyond the powers of the Union or establish new Union 
powers.  It is quite clear that the Charter itself does not give the Union new legislative 
competences in the field of fundamental rights.  But it seems entirely open in how far 
Article 51(2) CFR can serve to limit the applicability of Charter rights where Member State 
action is concerned.  The Court‟s short reference to that article in McB did nothing to clarify 
the situation.  Regarding a father‟s right to custody in respect of his children, which had not 
been accorded to him under national law, the Court said that it „might‟ infringe Article 51(2) 
CFR if such a right were read into the Charter.  With this reference the Court managed to 
obscure more than it elucidated since it left it open whether this would actually constitute an 
infringement.   
108. The insecurity in this respect became obvious in the case of ZZ in the English Court of 
Appeal, in which the Court of Appeal decided to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ.
112
  
The case mainly concerned the question whether a Member State which restricts the freedom 
of movement of an EU citizen on grounds of public policy under the Citizens‟ Directive113 
must reveal the essence of the allegations against that citizen.  The claimant argued that it 
was disproportionate to withhold the grounds for this restriction since it constituted a 
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violation of his right to an effective remedy under Article 47 CFR.  Kay LJ argued that the 
Charter did not apply to the case since the United Kingdom did not implement EU law when 
restricting the applicant‟s right to reside in the United Kingdom.114  Furthermore he argued in 
light of Article 51 (2) that there is no Union competence in the field of national security so 
that the Charter could not apply since the refusal was based on national security 
considerations.
115
  Carnwarth LJ argued that the case was more concerned with the Directive 
and not with the Union‟s competence on national security.  Thus he considered the argument 
that the Charter might apply to be worthy of exploration by the Court of Justice.  A similar 
argument was put forward by Moses LJ.   
109. Another English case worth mentioning in this respect is Zagorski which has been 
discussed earlier.
116
,  The High Court found that a refusal to ban the export of a product fell 
within the scope of the Charter since it constituted an implementation of EU law according to 
Article 51(1) CFR.  The High Court seemingly found ERT type cases (derogation from EU 
law) to be covered by the Charter.  What is interesting is that Zagorski was not about 
derogations from EU obligations but about the refusal to derogate, thus provoking the 
question whether such a case could be considered an „implementation of EU law‟.  
Answering the question in the affirmative, the High Court reasoned convincingly that EU law 
provided for a power of derogation.  Thus the question whether the Charter applied could not 
depend on which way the Business Secretary‟s decision of whether to ban the export or not 
went.  The decision of whether or not to exercise the power was held to be an implementation 
of EU law in the sense of applying it or giving effect to it.
117
 
110. A further point made by the High Court in Zagorski, was that ratione personae the 
Charter could only reach as far as the Convention.  Having found that the Convention did not 
apply to the plaintiff because he was on death row in the United States and thus not within the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom as required by Article 1 ECHR, the Court went on to 
conclude that for the same reason the Charter did not apply either.  The Court found this to be 
laid down in Article 52(3) CFR arguing that even though the Charter did not contain a 
provision similar to Article 1 ECHR, the Charter rights must have the same effect as the 
rights in the Convention.  This not only included the content of the rights „but also the scope 
of their application in the sense of the persons on whom the rights are conferred‟.118  This 
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view is novel in that it is neither reflected in the explanations to the Charter nor in the 
literature.  Furthermore it is untenable for two reasons.  First, the wording („meaning and 
scope‟) of Article 52 (3) suggests that it is only concerned with the material scope of the right 
and not issues of jurisdiction as is Article 1 ECHR.  Second, the High Court failed to see that 
Article 52(3) CFR explicitly allows for more extensive protection than the Convention.   
 
Q 12 Is there a general EU human rights competence, or should there be such competence?  
What are the implications for the future of the ECHR system of protection of rights? 
 
111. There is no evidence for a general human rights competence in the sense that the EU 
can legislate in all areas of human rights protection.  To the contrary, the Treaties and the 
Charter make it clear that no such competence exists.  Article 6(1) TEU states that the 
Charter shall not extend the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.  Essentially 
the same is contained in Article 51(2) CFR.  Furthermore, accession by the EU to the 
Convention must not affect the Union‟s competences.  These provisions are evidence for a 
desire on part of the Member States to avoid an undermining of the principle of conferral 
contained in Article 4(1) TEU.  Of course, as pointed out in the answer to question 11, the 
exact consequences of Article 51(2) CFR are not yet clear.  But nobody seems to argue that 
the entry into force of the Charter has led to a general EU human rights competence.
119
  Such 
a competence cannot be inferred from „positive obligations‟ to act resulting from such 
rights.
120
  Even if an obligation to act results from one of the Charter rights, this does not 
necessarily mean that the EU is obliged to remedy the lack of protection by passing 
legislation.  It is equally possible that the Member States might be under such an obligation.  
However, what can be witnessed is that EU legislation in the field of criminal law provides 
for extensive procedural guarantees which are there to comply with the requirements set out 
in Articles 47 and 48 CFR.
121
 
112. Another point is the issue of „reverse discrimination‟, i.e. a situation in which some 
nationals of the Member State are treated less favourably than others (including EU citizens).  
As EU law is not applicable in such cases, it cannot be relied upon.
122
  A solution has to be 
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found in domestic law.  Since there is no general right to equal treatment laid down in the 
statutes
123
, such a right would have to exist at common law in order to make reverse 
discrimination impossible in the United Kingdom.  Traditionally there is no sophisticated, 
substantive principle of equality at common law.
124
  In the Privy Council case of Matadeen v 
Pointu, Lord Hoffman argued that it was a general axiom of rational behaviour that that like 
cases should be treated alike and unlike cases differently.
125
   But these comments cannot be 
read as granting a right to equality before the law since Lord Hoffman then went on to state 
that „the fact that equality of treatment is a general principle of rational behaviour does not 
entail that it should necessarily be a justiciable principle‟.126  There is thus no rule under the 
common law that would per se outlaw reverse discrimination.
127
  A famous example in the 
United Kingdom for reverse discrimination is the issue of tuition fees charged at Scottish 
Universities.  While Scottish students
128
 and students coming from other EU Member States 
in effect pay no tuition fees at Scottish universities, students from the rest of the UK do.
129
  
From the point of view of UK constitutional law this is an expression of the constitutional 
settlement and a result of devolution. 
113. A maybe more interesting question is whether there should be such a competence.  
Again, no such argument has been advanced.  To the contrary, the political discussion in the 
United Kingdom appears to centre on the question of how to restrict the influence of 
„European‟ human rights.  A recent policy paper by Policy Exchange, a think tank, even 
argued for the UK‟s withdrawal from the Convention, albeit only as a last resort.130  The 
paper received considerable press coverage and was supported by Lord Hoffmann, a former 
Law Lord.
131
  This discussion is easily transferable to the question whether the EU should 
have a general human rights competence.  It is suggested that there would be great deal of 
scepticism if not hostility in the UK concerning such a proposal. 
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114. Since there is no general EU competence, there are no implications for the future of the 
Convention system from that alone.  But it is worth exploring what role is left for the 
Convention system after entry into force of the Charter.  It is argued that there is still a 
considerable role for the Convention in future.  Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Convention was 
merely treated as a source of inspiration for the ECJ when determining the content of the 
fundamental rights of the EU guaranteed as general principles of EU law.
132
  This has 
changed with the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty and with it of the Charter.  The Charter 
itself refers to the Convention in Article 52(3) CFR and formally incorporates its provision 
into EU primary law.
133
  This leads to the Convention being a binding „minimum standard‟ of 
fundamental rights protection in the EU.  Furthermore, accession by the EU to the 
Convention will subject the EU directly to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.  This will be 
another way of ensuring that the Convention is respected by the EU and its institutions, most 
notably the ECJ.   
 
Q 13 What role should be envisaged for EU institutions as to fundamental rights protection 
within a more polycentric constitutional system of Europe? Would you conclude on the basis 
of the development of the ever-widening scope of EU law and fundamental rights activity, as 
well as your discussion of the previous questions in your report, that a gradual but definite 
transfer of human rights protection has taken place from Member States to the EU and from 
the Council of Europe and ECHR to the EU? 
 
115. The EU‟s role is not that of a human rights organization, which has the aim of 
overseeing that human rights are adequately protected by its Member States no matter which 
institution of the Member State acted and in which particular function.  The role of the EU‟s 
institutions is different and resembles that of equivalent national institutions.  Two of the 
EU‟s institutions will have a crucial role to play with regard to human rights protection: the 
Commission and the ECJ.  The European Commission is often described as the guardian of 
the Treaties and is thus also the guardian of the EU‟s fundamental rights.  It has the power 
under Article 258 TFEU to bring infringement proceedings against a Member State should it 
find that the Member State has violated the Charter.  However, this power is limited in that 
the Member States are only bound by the EU‟s fundamental rights when implementing EU 
law, cf. Article 51(1) CFR.  Thus the supervisory function of the Commission differs from 
that which is typical for human rights organizations.  A similar difference in function can be 
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attested for the ECJ, which is not a general human rights court and can only adjudicate on 
human rights violations brought about by the Member States as far as they occurred within 
the scope of EU law.  Thus the role of the EU‟s institutions in the protection of fundamental 
rights is constitutionally limited.  They cannot fill out the function of an external control 
mechanism as they are internal to the EU.   
116. This means that the ECtHR‟s broader jurisdiction which also covers human rights 
violations in areas outside EU law is still necessary.  Furthermore, after accession the EU will 
itself be subjected to that Court‟s jurisdiction so that the ECtHR‟s role will certainly not be 
reduced.
134
  The role of the national courts in protecting fundamental rights has not 
diminished either.  Rather, one could argue that it may have expanded since national courts 
now have to apply the rights contained in the Charter as far as they bind the Member State.
135
 
117. For these reasons, it is difficult to establish that a transfer of human rights protection to 
the EU has happened or is about to happen.  It is true that the EU (and most notably the ECJ) 
have gained jurisdiction over fundamental rights disputes.  It is also to be expected that with a 
binding written catalogue of rights as a basis, the ECJ will seize the opportunity to expand its 
fundamental rights case law and adjudicate considerably more cases on these issues.  But the 
notion of a transfer would suggest that national courts and the ECtHR would lose an 
equivalent amount of jurisdiction over fundamental rights cases.  It is suggested that this is 
not the case since their role has not diminished.  Thus the Charter will probably lead to an 
overall increase in cases brought before all courts concerned, with the ECJ having a larger 
share proportionately.  But the overall caseload of national courts and the ECtHR is not set to 
diminish.  One can therefore conclude that the relative influence of the ECJ for the 
development of fundamental rights in Europe is likely to grow but it would go too far to 
conclude that the overall responsibility for fundamental rights will be transferred to it.  Rather 
it will remain a responsibility shared between different courts.   
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Q 14 Although fundamental rights protection in the EU has been triggered by Member State 
courts, the common constitutional traditions of Member States on fundamental rights 
protection have not functioned as an important direct source of protection in the case law of 
the ECJ. This gives rise to the general question what the role of the common and individual 
constitutional traditions can be at present and in future. 
 
118. The determination of the content of fundamental rights in the EU is already a complex 
affair.  This is largely due to the co-existence of a written fundamental rights catalogue (the 
Charter) and the unwritten (traditional) fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. 
Apart from the rights contained in the Convention, the common constitutional traditions of 
the Member States serve as sources of inspiration for their determination, cf. Article 6(3) 
TEU.  The common constitutional traditions of the Member States have not featured as 
prominently as the Convention in the ECJ‟s case law on fundamental rights as general 
principles.  It is suggested that this is largely due to difficulties in determining their precise 
content.  In contrast, the Convention provided the Court with a written document which had 
been ratified by all Member States and could therefore be considered a common denominator.  
Moreover, the ECtHR‟s case gave the ECJ a rich pool of interpretations of these rights to 
draw on.  Thus it is unlikely that the situation will change in the future given that the Charter 
provides the ECJ with a much more extensive written catalogue of rights and given that 
according to its Preamble the Charter reaffirms the existing rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States.   
119. But there is an interesting discussion in the literature about the role of individual 
constitutional traditions and particularly those which Nic Shuibhne calls un-common 
traditions.
136
  They could serve as „fundamental boundaries‟, i.e. as a space in which diverse 
constitutional traditions can continue to exist even within the scope of EU law.
137
  The main 
field of application for such fundamental boundaries would be cases in which Member States 
derogate from fundamental freedoms on grounds of public policy, etc., their own 
constitutional traditions might serve as justifications.  An example usually advanced in this 
context is the Omega decision where the ECJ referred to the German concept of human 
dignity and its particular status under the German constitution.
138
  This approach was taken 
up by the House of Lords.  Citing Omega, Lord Bingham argued that the ban on fox 
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 in the United Kingdom constituted a justifiable restriction of the freedom to 
provide services under EU law since the “killing of foxes […] by way of recreation infringed 
a fundamental value expressed in numerous statutes”.  Thus the House of Lords equally 
relied on a national value in order to justify a deviation from EU law.
140
   
120. The crucial (and unresolved) question is, of course, in how far national value 
judgments, which often have their roots in national constitutional traditions, should be 
accepted as justifications for deviating from free movement law.  The ECJ‟s most recent 
decision in Sayn-Wittgenstein sheds some light on this question but does not resolve it fully.  
The ECJ accepted an argument advanced by the Austrian government that in order to protect 
its own constitutional identity as a republic, it was justified in not fully recognising a name 
which one of its citizens had acquired by way of adoption since that name contained the 
designation of the applicant as a „princess‟ (Fürstin).  This deviation from the applicant‟s 
right to free movement (she resided in Germany) was considered to be justified on public 
policy grounds since the Austrian law on the abolition of the nobility constituted an element 
of its constitutional identity.
141
  The Court was however adamant to point out that the public 
policy exception must be interpreted strictly so that its scope cannot be determined by a 
Member State unilaterally.
142
  This caveat shows that the ECJ is willing to accept individual 
constitutional traditions but only in limited cases.  Unfortunately, there are no clear 
guidelines as to where the limits lie.  
Conclusion 
121. For the United Kingdom, the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the 
contemporaneous constitutional settlements, has caused a remarkable raising of the profile of 
human rights in law, practice and politics.  The results have not always been universally 
welcomed.  Internally, the courts‟ attempts to balance the conflicting requirements of Articles 
8 and 10 ECHR have aroused strong feelings.  And some decisions of the ECtHR, as well as 
of the UK Supreme Court, have provoked strong reactions in Scotland.  There is a general 
and perceptible feeling that the protection of human rights has become over-sophisticated and 
out of touch with public perceptions of what is fair and proportionate.  There is as yet little 
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experience upon which to assess the effect of the coming into force of the Charter.  And 
accession to the Convention, with its accompanying technical difficulties, lies in the future. 
122. It will be clear from the answers given above that, at present, the relationships between 
domestic (including devolved) law, the Convention and the Charter are so far, at least, 
complex and uncertain in their effects.  They are of course, and not least for that reason, 
immensely interesting to lawyers.  But neither the Convention nor the Charter was instituted 
to provide intellectual stimulation for the legal profession. 
123. The challenge for all those involved in the business of giving effect to the Convention, 
of implementing the Charter and of acceding to the Convention, will be to secure – and to 
demonstrate – that the Convention, the Charter and, when it comes, accession operate so as to 
produce tangible, real, practical benefits to the ordinary individual.  
 
 





(The views expressed in this Report are the personal views of the rapporteurs, and do not 
represent the views of the institutions to which they belong) 
 
 
